Introduction 

As Staub (1999) stresses, it was a universal hope that after World War II, the horrors of the Holocaust and Nazi Germany’s crusade against the Jewish people and millions of other people would bring such incredible violence to an end forever (304). But, instances of collective or group violence has plagued the second part of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century in Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Tibet, East Timor, Argentina, El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Colombia, Bosnia and Rwanda, among many other lesser-known places (Staub 1999, 304). These cases experienced collective or group violence in the forms of genocide, mass killing, widespread torture and the disappearances of large numbers of individuals (Suedfeld, 1990). The Rwandan genocide was between the Hutu majority, who made up about 85% of the eight million people and the Tutsi, who made up about 14% and about 800,000 Tutsis and 50,000 Hutu were murdered (Staub 2003, 25).

In order to best understand instances of immense violence, or in this case, the Rwandan genocide, an interdisciplinary perspective must be respected and encouraged. This paper draws upon literature from psychology, group psychology, cultural studies, social institutions, social conditions, micro- and macro-economics, international relations and political systems. With a valued and clear understanding of what occurred in the early 1990s in Rwanda, scholars and activists alike can better find ways of effective prevention of potentially violence-producing situations in Rwanda and beyond. The purpose of this paper is to use a few theories to better understand the Rwandan civil war and genocide and compare these theories to a mini-case study of Burundi. I will find evidence proving or disproving the theories and evaluate how useful each theory is. I will conclude by suggesting additional theoretical work that might be helpful in explaining both cases. When explaining the theories, I will start by summarizing their basic arguments, then highlight the evidence I have found supporting and/or disputing the theory and conclude with how useful or not the theory is to understanding human rights violations that took place in Rwanda from 1990-1994.

Background

To understand the implications of the theories I have chosen to explain this conflict, I will provide a brief summary of the overall nature of the Rwandan Civil War and Genocide Against the Tutsis.

The Rwandan Civil War began when fifty RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) rebels, later followed by a few thousand Ugandan and Rwandan soldiers, crossed into Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990 to fight for social, political and economic equality. The RPF was heavily outnumbered by the FAR (Rwandan Armed Forces, Hutu-led) forces backed by the Rwandan government. From 1991-1992, guerilla warfare took place. Hutu activists, supported by the government, began killing Tutsis in the countryside who were trying to avoid the war and live peacefully. In mid-1992, after what seemed to be endless fighting, rebel forces and then-President Habyarimana agreed to stop and met in the capital of Tanzania, Arusha, to bring peace negotiations. Finally, in 1993, the Arusha Accords, a final cease-fire, was signed by the Rwandan government and the RPF.

This Arusha Peace Agreement was orchestrated by the United States, France and the Organization of African Unity. This agreement included measures to allow multiple political parties, the rule of law, repatriation of refugees, power sharing processes and the combination of government and rebel armies to protect the overall country (Jones 1995). In 1992 and 1993, it was clear the Arusha Accords were not effective. Power and government responsibilities were not peacefully shared and collectively agreed upon. Hutu nationalists and the RPF were opposed to the power sharing measures and military control (Sarkin and Fowler, 2010). In late 1993, the United Nations Security Council commissioned Resolution 872 which established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in order to supervise the new transitional government and peacefully enforce the Arusha Accords.

The peace agreement was immediately broken when the airplane carrying Rwandan President Habyarimana and Burundian President Ntaryamira was shot down near the capital of Kigali in April 1994. Both presidents were Hutu. Responsibility of this attack is still under contention but many sources place the blame on the RPF. These assassinations became a catalyst for the 1994 genocide. The first victims of the killings were human rights activists, the Prime Minister and the President of the Supreme Court (HRW 1994). Within the first week, 20,000 people were killed. Most of the militia members tended to be of lower class but the common political ideal and material advantages of weaponry made them appealing to middle-class young people. (Prunier 1995). This was the beginning of one of the worst killings in the twentieth century. Within the next few months, Hutu extremists killed people at the fastest rate in known history (Prunier 1995: 261, 265). An estimated 800,000 Rwandans (mostly Tutsis) were killed during a 100-day period. After this massacre, 20% of the Rwandan population had been murdered. The terror of 1994 represented a much larger evolution of ethnic tensions of late colonial rule and succeeding revolutions (Newbury 1998).

Theory 1: Difficult Life Conditions and the Power of Elites

The first theory of understanding the given human rights violations in Rwanda will examine the role of elites and difficult life conditions from Staub (1989, 1999, 2003). In my view, it is hard to separate these two phenomena in this case study. Elites engineered the violence from the existing difficult life conditions among the Tutsi minority and Hutu majority. Using Staub’s theoretical approach, difficult life conditions and elite rule might provide fruitful insight to the civil war and genocide. Difficult life conditions like severe economic conditions, political turmoil and rapid societal change frustrate basic human needs (Staub 1989, 1999). These needs include basic financial and social security, a feeling of effectiveness and control, a positive identity and positive connections to a community (Staub 1999, 305). Poor life conditions do not always lead to mass violence but they make it easier for psychological processes in individuals and communities to turn against and harm members of another group (Staub 1999, 305). These conditions often lead to conflict over a territory because one group feels they have sovereignty over another group. Conflict over territory can have powerful psychological dimensions such as the need for security or group identification as in the case between Israelis and Palestinians (Staub 1999, 305). Conflict over territory may or may not be coupled with conflict between a dominant group and a subordinate group. According to Fein (1993), demands by subordinate groups for greater social, political and economic rights and resources have been frequent instigators of genocide since World War II. These demands and struggles may also lead to government transitions through an ethnic or revolutionary war (Institute for Genocide Studies, 1999). The violence fueled by these poor life conditions can be motivated by self-interest and the well-being of group identities, a community and survival. Instances of cultural survival, social and economic rights can be seen in an indigenous group that lives in a territory others want to own or develop as in the case of Native Americans in the United States (more specifically, the Sioux Tribe and Energy Transfer Partners building the Dakota Access Pipeline) or the Ache Indians in Paraguay (Staub 1999, 306).

Next, elites can create certain psychological and social processes which can lead individuals to believe another group is responsible for their problems and concerns. Elites frequently intensify already existing hostility toward groups and work to maintain differences between groups in power and status (Kressel, 1996). Scapegoating and claiming some other group is responsible for life problems can “satisfy needs of identity, connection and comprehension of reality” (Staub 1999, 306). If there are explicit social conditions and discrimination, ideologies can be adopted to identify the enemies and causes of political, social and/or economic problems. These ideologies usually identity the weakest group, the one with the less agency and political power and sometimes a historical antagonist. The ideology frames the newly-formed enemy as a block in the way of the ideology’s fulfillment. This fulfillment can be based on race, religion, intelligence, work ethic, worldview, economic progress, moral antagonism and overall superiority (Staub 1999, 306-307). Propaganda can generate hatred and justify acts of violence and enhance devaluation of the other group (or outgroup) (Staub 1999, 308). Paramilitary organizations established by national leaders and elites have been used as tools of collective violence in: Bosnia (Kressel, 1996), Rwanda (des Forges, 1999; Prunier 1995), Argentina (Nunca Mas, 1986) and other South American countries, Turkey, Germany (Staub, 1989) and elsewhere. In short, Staub (1989, 1999) has outlined some possible explanations for difficult life conditions and elites can cause violence. Certain psychological processes and the security of a group identity can frustrate basic human dignity. Poor life conditions combined with elite manipulation might be evident in the Rwandan civil war and genocide.

Theory 1: Tested

Before and during the civil war, there were reports the Tutsis were going to return to reclaim all their property (Staub 1999, 311). These reports were part of an extensive media campaign, especially through radio broadcasts. A privately-run radio station, owned by President Habyarimana supporters, the Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines began campaigns of hate-filled propaganda against Tutsi more generally in early 1992, and later it targeted individuals in late 1993. Some of the first Tutsis killed in the genocide were singled out by this radio station (HRW Report 1994). The genocide itself was systematic and organized by elite and Hutu leadership in its aim of eliminating the entire Tutsi population in Rwanda (Staub 1999, 312). Des Forges (1999) argued an extremist Hutu leadership strategically used images of Tutsi people as an absolute menace that had to be killed. Since the Hutu revolution in 1959 when many Tutsis were killed and Rwanda gained independence from Belgium, the Hutus controlled the country (Staub 1999, 313). This revolution was the first time Hutus became political in control. Between the fifteenth century and the 1959 revolution, the Tutsis ruled in a complex relationship with the Hutus with growing disparities among economic and social rights (Staub 1999, 312-313).

After the revolution, Tutsis had no access to public domain, they suffered discrimination in education opportunities, civil service position and intra-marriage between Tutsis and Hutus (Newbury 1998, 11). Although the Tutsis faced many dimensions of discrimination in various areas of everyday life, their past history, culture and educational status allowed them to have good jobs in the private sector (Staub 1999, 313). They were certainly the minority, but many were successful albeit discriminated against by the national government, elites and the media. Tutsi people were excluded from or marginalized in the administration of the country from the revolution the end of the genocide in mid-1994. An ideology of “Hutu power” and a “better world” was developed by the elite which included advocating for killing Tutsis (des Forges 1999; Gourevitch, 1998; Prunier, 1995; Staub 2003, 342). “Gregoire Kayibanda [first and second elected president of Rwanda] published the highly influential Hutu Manifesto (1957), which argued that Rwanda’s problems could be blamed entirely on the Tutsis. The Manifesto also contended that Rwanda could not be democratic until the government was controlled solely by the Hutu majority” (Kamola 2008, 65). According to Staub (1989), fulfilling these ideologies can be violent and killing the enemy can be seen as “good, right and desirable” (18).

Immaculée Ilibagiza, a survivor of the Rwandan genocide, wrote a book about her story titled, “Left to Tell, Discovering God Amidst the Rwandan Holocaust.” She begins the book by telling the time when she escaped death. The killers were within a few inches of her on the other side of a wall made of plaster and wood.

“There were many voices, many killers. I could see them in my mind: my former friends and neighbors, who had always greeted me with love and kindness, moving through the house carrying spears and machetes and calling my name. ‘I have killed 399 cockroaches,’ said one of the killers. ‘Immaculée will make 400. It’s a good number to kill.’”

After a few minutes which certainly felt like eternity, the killers left and spared the seven

people hiding in a small closet. The killers were her former friends. The ideology was strong and among other variables, influenced her neighbors to act and kill. The Tutsis became a devalued and disliked group over time which intensified hostility similar to the Jews in Germany and the Armenians in Turkey (Staub, 1989).

The cultural and societal context spawned these difficult life conditions of economic problems (more on this will be detailed later), social injustice and discrimination by elites and government policies. Intense anti-Tutsi sentiment and ‘Hutu power” ideology was propagated by the Hutu leadership and the life conditions provided a means of scapegoating the real cause of the everyday problems. Staub (1999) argued this ideology and fear of Tutsi hunt for power led segments of the population to participate in and justify the killings (313). It is clear that in Rwanda, preceding the genocide of 1994, there were both difficult life conditions and conflict between Hutus and Tutsis encouraged by elite manipulation and historical trends of power exchanges, “a combination that is an especially intense instigator [of violence]” (Staub 2003, 295). The evidence provided tests well for Staub’s theory. It is difficult to find evidence that would disprove Staub’s approach since he has researched Rwanda’s war and genocide in many of his books for decades. His work has been proven to be extremely helpful in understanding this case.

Theory 2:  Economic Structures and Rights Trade-Offs

Donnelly (2002) examines the most common economic development-rights trade-offs. These trade-offs are based on needs, equality and liberty (197-198). The needs trade-off is about constraining and controlling consumption to capture the largest possible share of investment (197). The equality trade-off is about perceiving inequality as a contributor of development, not just a consequence (197). Finally, the liberty trade-off concerns suspending civil and political freedoms in exchange for economically essential policies (198). Other economic frameworks include the trickle-down theory of growth of eventual returns to the lower class and the Kuznets curve (198). All these development-rights trade-offs are conceptions of policy and which way to govern a society. There have been wide instances of development strategies by repressive regimes in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and China in recent decades (199). International dependence on foreign aid and financial institutions like the IMF and World Back have since the 1990s increasingly advocated for economic contributions of “good governance” (200).

Simply put, the contemporary enthusiasm for markets and neo-liberalism, even in the United States, is problematic from a human rights perspective (201). “Market systems produce inequality of income and wealth, they obstruct democracy,” (Lindblom 2001, 236) by elite control of the masses and inefficient practices. Markets are supported by individuals and firms and encouraged by governments upon arguments of the collective good and aggregate benefits (Donnelly 2002, 201). But, markets do not foster social equity and equal rights for everyone. There is an unequal playing field among market participants of individuals and firms. “Of the one hundred largest organized entities in the world, only a half are nations, the other half are corporations.” (Lindblom 2001, 62) When such massive corporations fail in the market, they sometimes call on the public to respond and recover from their managerial errors and provide a safety net to prevent high unemployment. Corporations can draw on public funds almost any time they want and act as “an oversized, greatly empowered citizen.” (237) The average citizen has virtually no power to prevent a corporation from committing a spillover, banning research on soil contamination, or persuading campaigns to agree with their interests with large contributions. Markets can make it difficult for governments to respond to the majority of its citizens needs or those needing the most economic help when confronted with corporations as “oversized” and influential citizens.

Enterprises can also control economic and social growth in developing countries. The International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank force orthodoxy on developing nations and are easily accessible and manipulated by corporations. Individuals, especially those with low-valued skills are usually victims of a “vicious rights-abusive cycle of exclusion” of market power and agency (Donnelly 2002, 201). These people have little influence over their economic opportunities. The so-called aggregate benefits of the market system do not benefit everyone equally. Market transactions are derived by prior determinations (distribution of assets and skills from custom, law and inheritance) and these barriers do not allow people to escape from certain inefficiencies. Prior determinations ban certain participants from the market system and do not efficiently allocate skills and assets equally among society. It does not adequately stimulate equality between market players because of prior determinations, division of labor and self-interested transactions and behaviors (Lindblom 2001). Donnelly (2002) argues free markets “sacrifice individuals and their rights to a ‘higher’ collective good” (202). As described, markets and the entire structure do not always protect human rights of economic opportunity and prosperity for all, instead the system is guided by large corporations, prior determinations and short-term, self-interested transactions. A possible compromise of economic prosperity and protection of individual rights is that of liberal democratic welfare states. These states do not protect all human rights but their markets and democracies operate within systematic limits set by human rights of domestic and international law (202).

Economic conditions may threaten and frustrate human rights depending on certain characteristics of a country. As Freeman (2011) states, capital accumulation and technological progress are two of the major causes of economic growth but these are dependent on strong institutions, international politics, trade, geography and culture. Institutions can protect property rights and the rule of law. Geography can affect access to natural resources, health and productivity and robust institutions can distribute these benefits across a society. International factors may undermine institutions in poor countries and support corruption (Pogge 2005). Loans and structural adjustment programs by the World Bank and the IMF have been criticized as ineffectual, undemocratic, violations of economic and social rights and only serving the interests of Western capital at the expense of the poor (Stiglitz 2002; Freeman 2011, 193). Also, the more unequal a country is, the higher level of poverty, which can slow sustainable development and not necessarily improve human rights (Besley and Burges 2003; Freeman 2011, 185). The World Bank and other financial institutions might fund corrupt and incompetent governments and discourage local initiatives (Freeman 2011, 186). Poor countries might lack the institutional capability to use the funds effectively and measures of democratic accountability of using the funds in the best interest of the entire citizenry (Freeman 2011, 186).

In sum, certain economic conditions consisting of corporations manipulating the system and overpowering individual control of the markets, unequal distribution of the market benefits, weak domestic institutions and ineffective aid from international agencies can all contribute to violations of human rights and liberty trade-offs. As Freeman (2011) says, “development science is undeveloped” (186), there exists controversy around the definitions and methodological approaches of ‘development’ and ‘poverty’ and the theoretical basis is weak. With this in mind, an economic explanation of the Rwandan civil war and genocide will be discussed next.

Theory 2: Tested

Kamola (2008) studied the causes of the civil war and genocide by examining Rwanda’s position within the international coffee market, its macro-political relations of extraction, political control and capital intensification. By 1980, the price of coffee had increased to six fold what it had been in 1962, when the International Coffee Agreement was signed shielding Latin American producers from allowing African growers a greater market share (60). The agreement became an outdated from of market control that threated free trade and was not renewed in 1989 (62). The cancellation the agreement sparked massive price volatility, especially for countries with large stockpiles of coffee. Large transnational corporations like Nestlé, Philip Morris, Sara Lee, and Procter $ Gamble were strong enough to absorb much of the fall but developing countries were not as fortunate (62). Rwanda suffered from massive unemployment as the price of coffee fell dramatically. Poverty was already rampant in large part by domestic policies and institutions that consolidated the high coffee revenue into the hands of a few Hutu elites (66). Before the crash, coffee exports comprised 82% of Rwanda’s total income in 1986 (67). The ruling elite spent the income from coffee on luxury goods and the political payoffs necessary to stay in power (67). Before the civil war began, there were already existing tensions between Hutu business and state elite, urban and rural populations and Tutsis. The growing economic inequality and distribution of the income to the ruling Hutu elite, aided instances of political violence and civil unrest (67). Many of those unemployed due to the fall of coffee were trained into the paramilitary groups responsible for the most of the killing during the civil war and genocide (67). The extreme fall of the price of coffee in 1989 and international trade dynamics could be seen as one cause of violence and human rights violations.

The falling coffee prices also bankrupted the Rwandan government since they relied so heavily on one commodity for their gross national income. To make matters worse, “in November 1990 and June 1991, based on World Bank recommendations, Rwanda devalued its currency by 40 percent and 15 percent, respectively, resulting in massive inflation” (Kamola 2008, 67). The IMF and the World bank dumped millions of dollars into Rwanda’s national bank intended to service the country’s sizeable debt and encouraged trade liberalization and the abolition of agricultural subsidies to jumpstart the economy (68). Unfortunately, much of this money was used to purchase firearms, ammunition, grenades and heavy weaponry from France, Egypt and South Africa. An estimated $112 million was spent on weaponry (68). Foreign aid earmarked for development projects was used to buy less expensive weapons like hos, axes and machetes from China (68). An influx of millions of dollars, rising political and violent tensions among the Hutu-led national government and the minority Tutsi population made it easy for Habyarimana loyalists to purchase arms and recruit members of the youth to paramilitary groups. With a period of a few weeks, the MRND loyalist group, expanded from 5,000 to 40,000 soldiers (68). Coffee prices alone cannot be seen as a direct cause of the civil war and genocide because other coffee-dependent countries did not experience the same effects of the market crash. The genocidal acts would not have been allowed and encouraged by the government if it was not for deep notions of ethnic division and the available stockpiles of weapons.

Kamola (2008) has attempted to explain and understand the economic context which might have helped cause the horrific violence. An international and domestic economic perspective was used to explain and describe the weak institutions of Rwanda, how it spent aid from financial institutions and how development before the crash was narrowed to the rich and wealthy Hutu elite and not the broader population. Kamola (2008) found evidence supporting a market economy does not always protect social, economic and human rights. Certain divisions of labor were preferred over others under the Habyarimana regime, in order to keep coffee as the largest export. Rwanda had state-run marketing boards and expansion of coffee output primarily benefit the elite who sold coffee on the international market “at rates significantly higher than the prices paid to the farmers” (67). More and more farmland leading up the crash was converted from subsistence farming to coffee production to increase revenue. A rights-based approach to development was certainly not exercised in Rwanda. Kamola (2008) does not mention psychological effects of the economy on individuals and why the economic crash justified mass killing. Ethnic tensions coupled with extreme unemployment and available weaponry might persuade some Hutus to murder the Tutsi, but 800,000 people were killed in about three months. A strong psychological process and emphasis on group identity and survival would have been more helpful in understanding this case.

Burundi: A Mini-Case Study

In order to test how generalizable these theories are, I will test Staub’s framework of elite influence and difficult life conditions and Kamola’s international trade dynamics to human rights violations in Burundi from 1993-2006 as a result of ethnic divisions between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority. According to a BBC News Report, some 300,000 people were killed in 1993-1994. Burundi has a similar history of Rwanda. Both nations were led by a Tutsi monarch and were colonized by the Belgians and Germans. Tutsi extremists assassinated the first democratically elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye in October 1993. As a result, violence between the Hutus and Tutsis broke out and according to a 1996 UN report into the assassination, “acts of genocide against the Tutsi minority were committed in October 1993” (Part V, Section II, No. 496). In the plane crash that killed President Habyarimana of Rwanda, President Ntaryamira was also killed. A genocide did not immediately follow in Burundi as in Rwanda but there was violence and unrest. Various power sharing measures existed between the Hutu presidencies following the plane crash and the Tutsi military. Civil war continued involving coups and short-term transitional governments.

Although, Rwanda and Burundi are two small neighboring countries that share the same ethnic composition, Uvin (1999) found different causes of mass violence. Burundi is a case of wide social cleavages, political power disparities and ethnic discrimination enforcing these divisions. Both cases have long-standing histories of widespread and indiscriminate killing (263). Both also have links between political power – control of the state – and ethnicity. However, in Burundi, ethnic difference constitutes the dividing line between the haves and the have-nots (263). While in Rwanda, the dividing line was social and regional, not ethnic. “The political competition for scarce resources was primarily intra-Hutu. Ethnic violence followed from a “racist” strategy of legitimization used by the ruling elite to maintain its power” (263). The social structure in both countries is almost identical, both have extreme economic inequality and both had elites who employed divergent strategies of state control and legitimizing their superiority over the Tutsi minority (266). Uvin (1999) found the biggest difference was the social composition of the ruling elite (267). Staub’s role of elites and difficult life conditions translates stronger than Kamola’s relationship of coffee and genocide, based on the existing literature. Both countries export coffee and suffered from the crash in 1989. Uvin’s article comparing the different paths of mass violence aligns more with elite rule over a citizenry and using the media and government policies to further discriminate along ethnic differences by Staub.

Conclusion

It was not until 1998 when the World Bank declared:

“By helping to fight corruption, improve transparency, and accountability in governance, strengthen judicial systems, and modernize financial sectors, the Bank contributes to building environments in which people are better able to pursue a broader range of human rights.” (World Bank 1998: 3)

Although Freeman (2011) writes in 1989 the World Bank included human rights in its ‘good governance’ criteria (193). Even so, the Bank focuses more on violations of bank policy than on human rights and the Inspection Panel, established in 1993 only hears complaints of bank policy violations (Freeman 2011, 193). Rights-based approaches to development may include empowering marginalized groups, challenging oppression and exclusion and changing power relations, which are political dilemmas and can be supported through international coalitions, blaming and shaming mechanisms, normative pressure and whistle-blowers (Uvin 2007, 604). In short, the relationship between rights and development is complex but Kamola (2008) narrowed on international trade as a means of economic development and found the Rwandan government exercised a liberty trade-off and did not ‘pursue a broader range of human rights’ as stated by the World Bank. The loan money from the Bank and IMF actually worsened corruption and democratic accountability by allowing Rwanda to purchase firearms to pursue the Hutu manifesto. In the end, Staub’s work seems to best explain and understand the Rwandan Civil War and Genocide Against the Tutsis. He examines the role of elites, poor life conditions and ideology which were all supported by empirical work.

However, no explanation based on theory and evidence should be ignored and “it should by now be clear that there can be no single, simple explanation of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda” (Hintjens 1999, 280). The root of the causes of human rights violations in Rwanda and Burundi arguably stem from deeply-held understandings of discrimination and a popular support for separate identities of people belonging to the same country.

Another relevant study is that of Coller and Hoeffler (1998) who found the relationship between civil wars and ethnic diversity is non-monotonic; highly fractionalized societies have no greater risk of experiencing a civil war than homogenous ones. These authors had both Rwanda and Burundi in their sample, as well as most of Africa. There cannot be one simple explanation for a human rights violation; that is not how political scientists best understand the field. Ethnic diversity, poor life conditions, high unemployment, available weaponry, elite influence, high inflation and ideology were all helpful at understanding what happened in Rwanda. Staub’s work looked at more concrete examples of elite manipulation in the media and government policies that widened the justified the discrimination of the Tutsis. Kamola broadened the explanation by studying international relations and trade as a cause of violence. Both theories could have looked at the individual more in detail and what specific psychological processes were necessary to agree with the “Hutu power” ideology and more specifically, justify hunting neighbors and friends as in Ilibagiza’s intimate story.

Waller’s (2002) social-psychological framework from Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing focuses on the individual psychology on committing violence. Decades of oppression, social dominance shifting between the Hutu and Tutsi people and ‘us vs them’ ideology are definitely all important. Waller used a cultural belief system, authority orientation and moral disengagement (ideology and propaganda) to explain instances of group-think and violence. More specifically, with respect to the perpetrators, he outlines professional socialization, group conformity and the merger of the “role” and person. This theory would have been discussed further but due to lack of adequate literature supporting his framework, I focused more on works by Staub and Kamola. Staub examines the psychology of violence more than Kamola but Waller dedicates more of his approach to xenophobia, cultural systems, and the dehumanization of the victims. Both theories tested earlier are very useful to understanding Rwanda.

One last suggestion to explain the dynamics of the cases in Rwanda and Burundi would be the ‘bystanders of evil’ dilemma from Staub (2003). France sent troops in 1990 to aid the Rwandan government because of the relationship between President Mitterrand of France and the president of Rwanda, Habyarimana. (Staub 2003, 347). During the genocide in April 1994, Belgian peacekeepers and the United Nations withdrew their forces. The United Nations and the United States resisted calling the violence a “genocide” so the genocide convention (requires international pressure) would not be invoked. Also, “the United States slowed down a vote in the Security Council on sending back peacekeepers, even though U.S. troops were not required” (Staub 2003, 347). However, during and after the genocide in Rwanda, global outrage became so present that the International Criminal Court and the principle of the Responsibility to Protect emerged (Lauren 2011, 302). As Lauren (2011) writes, “in so many ways, human rights emerge in the wake of human wrongs” (302). Theories and approaches to explaining and understanding human rights violations must be carefully examined and critically compared among each other so we do not have to wait for wrongs to establish more rights and protections.

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