Constructivism is based on identity and interest formation as they pertain to international relations. This concept stems from the accepted theories of liberalism which believes countries share common interests and have the opportunity to cooperate and realism which believes the world is always under a constant threat of conflict. Constructivism shares ideals brought up by those two umbrellas of IR theories, but it focuses more on the social construct of policy and state behavior. Constructivists seek to determine what causes these interests and why states act differently to different states. An overarching question constructivists face is whether “foreign policy identities and interests of states are exogenous or endogenous to the state system” (Wendt 1992, 402). Do states have certain interests because of the anarchic nature of the international system or because of cultural/domestic reasons? Identities and interests of states can be shaped by policy, war, cooperation, but is it possible to measure these characteristics or is constructivism merely an approach to study state behavior rather than a theory of how the world works? In this essay, I will attempt to answer these questions as well as analyze constructivism based on specific readings by offering a sense of what it means, what makes it different than traditional IR theories, and how it can improve.

First, in almost all disciplines of social science, there is a level of uncertainty. We study people and people can rarely be exactly studied and analyzed. As some say, we have to be certain of our uncertainties. Constructivism is no different. Its “empirical mission is to surface the background that makes uncertainty a variable to understand, rather than a constant to assume” (Hopf 1998, 188). States must behave for specific reasons and although they are made up of people, they can be studied and analyzed. Constructivists aim to discover identities and social practices within states and explain how those identities and interests effect state actions. Similar to individuals, states can have multiple interests and identities. A person can be a man, father, husband, co-worker, boss, or citizen similar to how a state can be a leader of the free world, a sovereign and powerful enemy, an imperial power, or an ally (Wendt 1992). These identities are always changing and are dependent on the perspective of the opposite state or individual. Constructivism brings cultural and domestic politics to the international table. It is a combination of “structural linguistics, postmodern political theory, critical theory, cultural and media studies, literacy criticism,” not to mention cognitive and social psychology and political culture (Hopf 1998, 196). In regards to the uncertainty principle mentioned earlier, constructivism strives to reduce uncertainty which can prevent war, tension, and discrimination by providing meaning to states’ identities. Social and cultural practices can allow states to predict other states behaviors and intentions, the goal of constructivism.

For example, many political scientists believe democracies do not fight each other. Constructivists turn the table slightly and argue democracies do not or rarely fight each other not because they are democracies but because of how they understand each other and the socio-international practices they accompany. Cooperation is possible under constructivism but it because states perceive each other as cooperative. These perceptions are fueled by social and cultural norms, which can include economics, regime type, religion, history, among many others. States find it easier to cooperate with allies than with adversaries but under this branch of international relations, they study why states are allies or adversaries with each other. What identities are at play that would cause states to behave the way they do with one another? Similar to how culture brings identity to domestic politics, constructivists look at how identities play abroad. They believe identities depend on historical, cultural, political, and social context. Every state action depends on context from a variety of lenses, as you can see. For example, the United States wanted to limit the spread of communism so it involved itself in wars in Vietnam and other countries in South America and Southeast Asia because it saw the Soviet Union as communist. The United States identified itself as anti-communist and carried that torch to other states and regions, not only the Soviet Union.

Not only do identities and interests play a part in foreign policy, but so do norms which are socially constructed. There are “three processes by which international norms develop and become implemented domestically: instrumental adaptation and strategic bargaining, moral consciousness-raising, and institutionalization and habitualization” (Tannewald 2005, 12). In other words, international norms are established through societal pressure from domestic and transnational groups, diplomacy, state decisions of moral conscience, and precedence of iterated behavior over time. For example, as Nina Tannewald discussed in the article, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo” (2005), the taboo of the nuclear bomb was created using all four of those steps. In 1950, over 500 million people all over the world signed the “ban the bomb” petition initiated by the World Peace Council in Stockholm – societal pressure. August 1948, the UN Atomic Energy Commission defined weapons of mass destruction as: “atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above” (Tannewald 2005, 20) – diplomacy and international rhetoric. During the 1960s, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson publicized their strong personal objections to nuclear weaponry – individual state decisions of moral conscience. Lastly, no weapon of mass destruction has been used against another country since the end of World War II – marking a precedence. The single use of nuclear weapons would not constitute permission for other countries to use them according to constructivists, the precedence is too strong.

Second, constructivism makes the case international relations is socially constructed. Realism says the anarchic nature of international politics forces states to act in specific ways; these include defending their own self-interest in terms of power and that they can rely on no-one. According to constructivists, the anarchic nature has very little to do with how states interact with each other. It depends on how the states perceive anarchy which influences their behavior. An anarchy of friends is different than an anarchy of enemies (Wendt 1995). Social constructions are the unspoken and usually unquestioned practices of states and these determine when a state should be cooperative and try to maximize its security without affecting another or act in a self-help system where it is nearly impossible to depend on another state for assistance. Constructivism does not entirely disregard the assumptions of realism or structuralism such as the existence of anarchy, centrality of states, level of uncertainty, rational choice, and goal of survival, but it does take a deeper look at how what happens inside a country affects how it is identified on the outside.

Constructivists do not have a balance of power or a balance of threat like realists but rather a balance of threat perception. States can still go to war with each other but it is not because of the anarchic structure rather because of the cultural and social differences separating the enemies. States can also, like I said earlier, have different identities and interests with different states, but these will lead to different consequences. Cooperation between states under a constructivist approach is possible but it derives from reconstructing identities and interests in terms of shared norms. For example, four decades of cooperation have transformed a positive interdependence into a collective identity in Europe (Wendt 1992, 417). Sovereignty is also important when discussing states’ identities. If a state is not viewed as sovereign then it will probably be conquered. The sovereignty of a state is an ongoing accomplishment of practice and policy, however. “The institution of sovereignty transform identities” (Wendt 1992, 413), meaning when a state is sovereign it has an easier time forming an identity and a culture to showcase to the international system.

Liberalists believe in a shared harmony of interests which lead to cooperation between states. Constructivists believe these shared interests are made from social relationships, shared knowledge, material resources, practices that are used to strengthen ties between states. “Constructivists argue material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded” (Wendt 1995, 73). For example, British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States because of the embedded cultural and historical shared practices between the two states than North Korean nuclear weapons. Constructivists do believe alongside liberalists there can be harmony between all states but all states first must perceive each other to be allies and not enemies. They do not expect this to be a reality any time soon but I do not think they completely rule it will never happen.

In order to analyze the social construction of international politics, we must first analyze how the process of interaction produces and reproduces the social structures whether cooperative or conflictual and how this shapes actors’ identities and interests and the significance of their social and historical contexts (Wendt 1995). Overall, state interests are part of identity construction. These interests are a combination of nationalism, religion, race, gender, ethnicity, and sexuality, everything which could categorize or identify an individual is a factor of a state’s identity. These identities offer an understanding between states, a concept neither realism nor liberalism sheds light on.

Third, as described, constructivism is a very complicated subject. Studying a state’s identity requires mountains of data. It requires a researcher to spend large amounts of time at every major facet of a state to best identify how it operates, how it is different from other states, and why it is the way it is. It is seemingly very difficult to measure a state’s identity. To do this sort of research for one state, not to mention every states seems near impossible. Constructivism does bring new features and perspectives on why states act the way they do but it seems this theory is not yet a theory, but an approach. Constructivism lacks causal/constitutive elements to identities, norms, practices, and social structures (Hopf 1998). International relations is still a fairly young field of study and new theories are being discovered often.

Constructivism adds the social aspect to realism and liberalism but those two are still the dominating theories. If constructivism wants to be taken more seriously, then it should come up with ways to determine causality of certain identities and norms. It should have more concrete findings and examples to better defend its case. Like with any theory, it is hard to prove something would not have happened when in fact it did not happen. We cannot go back in time and change a social construct to see what would have happened differently. Constructivism does have some convincing arguments such as how military power norms are engineered by countries who have PGMS at their disposal (Beier 2003), how a taboo of nuclear weaponry was surfaced by social groups as discussed by Tannewald (2005), and how the genocides of Native Americans and Africans happened because Western states did not perceive them as sovereign people (Wendt 1992, 414). These all show the importance of identities and how they affect states’ behavior but this branch needs to come up with more conclusive and easier ways to measure what impact a state’s identity and how it shapes their decision-making abroad.

References:
Beier, J. Marshall. 2003. “Discriminating Tastes: Smart Bombs, Noncombatants and Notions of Legitimacy in War.” Security Dialogue. (December).
Hopf, Ted. 1998. “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” International Security. (Summer): 171-200.
Tannewald, Nina. 2005. “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of Nuclear Taboo.” International Security. (Spring): 5-49.
Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of It.” International Organization. (Spring): 391-425.
Wendt, Alexander. 1995. “Constructing International Politics.” International Security. (Summer): 71-81.