There seem to be two distinct camps within the response to democratic peace theory. Democratic peace theory states that democratic states rarely, if ever, go to war with each other. This theory is based on liberalism and its ideals that follow. From various authors who differ on the inclusiveness of this theory, I will first analyze the arguments of those who believe democratic peace theory is valid then I will analyze the arguments of those who don’t. I will conclude by discussing the implications and what I think is missing from the literature.

In order to understand democratic peace theory we should begin with understanding its background and core belief system, in other words, liberalism. All persons, according to liberalism, “share a fundamental interest in self-preservation and material well-being (Owen, 93-94). Liberalism stresses the – what some may call idealist – harmony of interests among all individuals. Once individuals realize there is this harmony of interests among all people, it will be in their best interest to cooperate. Cooperation and diplomacy can greatly prevent war. A liberal democracy is simply when a government rules off of the majority and protects the beliefs of liberalism. Crucial to the structure of liberal democracy is that citizens have leverage over their government. Individual freedoms and rights are what separates democracy from other forms of government such as autocracies and oligarchies. Since liberal democracies are governed by their constituents and not by an elite class or a single person, they are seen as “reasonable, predictable, and trustworthy” (Owen 95) but can’t a group of individuals within a state not follow these characteristics? I will answer this question later.

Another characteristic of democratic peace theory is that in order for a state to be a liberal democracy, it must be perceived as one by other states. An example of when some believe this theory has failed is the U.S. Civil War. This was a war between two liberal democracies, some believe. The Confederacy fought the Union because they believed slavery should be allowed in the Western Territory. The Union believed slavery violated human rights and freedoms enumerated within the Constitution. Proponents of the democratic peace theory do not call this an outlier of the theory because foreign states did not view the Confederacy as a liberal democracy. It was not until the Emancipation Proclamation when England, for example, shifted its support to the Union. This eased the tension in Europe because it was at this point when foreign states stop viewing the Confederacy as a liberal democracy. William Gladstone, who was Prime Minister of the UK four separate times in the latter half of the nineteenth century said after the Emancipation Proclamation, “A war with the United States…ought to be unpopular on far higher grounds [referring to the Union’s blockade of the South preventing England from receiving goods like cotton and spices], because it would be a war with our kinsmen [liberal belief of international unity] for slavery” (Owen 114). England and the United States had fought against each other about fifty years prior but the unity liberal democracies can bring is hard to disprove. Other scholars have found the U.S. Civil War as a strong example disproving democratic peace theory but they may not understand is a liberal democracy has to not only be viewed as one by its citizens but also by foreign states. (England and other European states saw the Union as reasonable and trustworthy because they were fighting for liberal ideals – equal rights, individual liberties, etc.)

President Wilson, in his 1917 war message to Congress said, “a steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations.” (Russett 5) A common interest of peace brought by democracy that could lead to an end to all wars was the highlight of Wilson’s presidency. Some called him an idealist, fighting for a utopia that would never exist, but in the end, an international alliance called the League of Nations was formed, albeit weak, it did open the door to something greater. Many people criticize Wilson’s idealism by the outbreak of World War II but in the interwar period, there were relatively small conflicts between democracies. A republican democracy must have its people vote the government officials into power and the officials’ jurisdiction/authority must be agreed upon by the people. Russett, in his book, Grasping the Democratic Peace, listed possible instances of wars between democracies then explains how they still fit the theory. One of which was the Second Philippine War of 1899 where the United States tried to control the Spanish colony it had just acquired. The Philippine government resisted but their government was not democratically elected, following the theory. Another instance, is the Spanish-American War in the previous year. Spain at the time, was ruled by two parties and the king was selected by the ministry. However, the central government controlled elections by selecting the candidates and by posting the (fake) election results the day before polling day (Russett 19). Spain might have seen itself as a liberal democracy but by American standards, it was not perceived as such.

Russett also uses quantitative analysis to hold the generalization of no wars between democracies true. Between the years 1946 and 1968, the odds that any two democratic states would have a militarized dispute was 1 in 276 (Russett 21). This statistic might seem convincing but when you look at the number of total democratic states during this time period and their geographic location, it seems more believable.

Liberalism breathes off of shared interests and common forms of political structures, in this case democracy, to prevent war and bring about peace but that’s not the whole story of reality, some argue. First, states are more likely to be peaceful with each other when they share international institutions, sure these can be created between democracies, but not always. Second, distance/geography is a factor leaders of states face when deciding to go to war. Most wars until the post-World War II period were fought by adjacent states because of our limited ability to cross land, water, and air. Since World War II, democracies have tended to be relatively few and far between geographically. Now, that “1 in 126” statistic seems a little more believable. Third, alliances make peace. However, alliances are formed along shared interests among states but these states are not always liberal democracies. Fourth, wealth or economic interdependence makes peace. Some scholars argue the United States and China will never go to war because of how economically tied the two states are to each other and how costly it would be to the global market. Lastly, political stability makes peace. Democracies do tend to be more politically stable because political exchange between parties is more of a norm than in autocracies. Liberal democracies may prevent wars aesthetically but that is not the whole story, it is a combination of geography, institutions, wealth, political stability, and alliances that spread peace.

Let’s shift to the scholars who point out the flaws in democratic peace theory. Locke argued that states, like individuals in a state of nature, “have a right to destroy those who violate their rights to life, liberty, and property” (Rosato 588). This means democracies deciding to go to war for self-defense is just but there is disagreement as to what degree of self-defense is exactly tolerated. During the Cold War, the United States had covert military operations against the following states, all of which were democracies: Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1957-), British Guyana (1961-), Brazil (1961,1964), Chile (1973), and Nicaragua (1984-) but were these all over self-defense tactics? As mentioned earlier, democracies rarely go to war with each other because they find each other to be “reasonable, predictable, and trustworthy” but that is rarely the case. During the Cold War, the United States had interventions in these democratic states to prevent the spread of communism by replacing their regimes with autocracies “rather than negotiate with them in good faith or secure their support by diplomatic means” (Rosato 590). In these instances, war was not the last resort in solving these conflicts, but the first and most preferred option. With the United States, it seems, according to scholars that economic interests and American nationalism/exceptionalism/tunnel vision/what you decide to call it are all superior mindsets in international decision-making than democratic trust and fair diplomacy. “The fact remains that the United States did not treat fellow democracies with trust or respect” (Rosato 591).

On the premise that states do not fight other states that are seen as liberal democracies by the international community is also debatable. Perceptions of an enemy’s regime type are almost always contested and rarely stable over a period of time. The United States referred publicly to Imperial Germany as a democracy before World War I but when its relationship started to deteriorate, so did its democratic label. Not until after a conflict is over, is the regime type of an enemy agreed upon; perception of an enemy regime is rarely a causal factor of war but more of an outcome.

Liberal democracies might not decide to go to war for fear of the costs and fear of losing political seats in the following election cycle. But again, this is not reality. “Autocrats have been removed 35% of the time and punished 27% of the time, while democrats have only been removed 27% of the time and punished 7% of the time” (Rosato 594). Let me remind you that it is harder to remove public officials from office in an autocracy but even then, democratic officials should be removed far greater times to align with democratic peace theory.

What I think the strongest answer against the theory is the process of public opinion. Normally, in times of crises, a state’s leader can lead public opinion instead of follow it by controlling the flow and frame of information to the public through the media. When a leader calls upon the public to support military efforts to defend or spread “our way of life” then he or she will have greater success than ignoring the power of nationalism to garner public support. Costs of war and the ideals of liberalism, once again can be blinded by the systemic nature of nationalism.

The United States, some would say the most liberally democratic state on the planet has called for military action more than two hundred times, five of which were constitutionally declared by Congress and the rest were unilaterally administered by the president (Rosato 597). The United States has continually used military tactics to solve conflicts, many times, when there was no legitimate conflict present (in hindsight or otherwise). The United States has fought with other liberal democracies over oil, land, and communism, to name a few. From the literature I have read, it seems realism and democratic peace theory have more in common than most would think. Democratic peace theory “is essentially a post-World War II phenomenon restricted to the Americas and Western Europe” (Rosato 599). It makes sense that the United States a regional (some might say global) hegemon would link democracy and peace together. If the United States wants to keep its power stable it should continue saying democracy is the right avenue to peace and that its actions to spread democracy (even through torture, nuclear weapons, airstrikes, etc) are in the best interest of all states.

The question still exists, however, is democratic peace theory conclusive? Since World War II, 90% of all democratic dyads have been confined within the Americas and Western Europe (Rosato 600), two regions that have strong alliances, strong economic interdependence, similar backgrounds, relatively open immigration policies, and relatively social acceptance between the two regions, not to mention the same religion, language, class structure, etc. I think liberal democracies are less likely to go to war with one another but not only because of their regime type but also because of the numerous factors I just listed. The more similarities two states find within one another, the less likely war will arise, democracy is only one similarity and does not guarantee the prevention of war. A further discussion on way states act the way they do should be called upon by the nature of power and interests and not by the regime type since you can see there is no consensus democracy creates peace. Democratic peace theory does not look at all the dimensions on how and why democracies act the way they do. “Future research ought to pay more attention to why democracies have allied with one another” (Spiro 79), for example and what causes trade and international agreements between democracies. It will be difficult to discover a theory that can explain all actions of states because “like human nature…international anarchy produces both peace and war” (Doyle 29) and that will (mostly likely) forever be the status quo.

Sources:
Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, Chs 1 and 2.
Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, Chs 1 and 2.
John Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International Security. Fall 1994, 87-125.
David Spiro, “The Statistical Insignificance of Liberal Peace.” International Security. Fall 1994, 50-86.
Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory.” American Political Science Review. 97(4):585-602.